

5 May 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-45: CURRENT ATTITUDES OF THE FREE
WORLD TOWARD THE SOVIET THREAT*

THE PROBLEM

To assess (a) Soviet attempts to promote apathy toward the Soviet threat; (b) situations which the Soviets may view or foresee as vulnerable to their aim; (c) the extent to which nations of the free world may have altered their views of the Soviet threat; and (d) internal or other factors which may cause the various free nations to give less attention to the Soviet threat than is warranted by either short-term or long-term security.

*Excludes consideration of the US

SUGGESTED OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM

I. SOVIET TACTICS TO DIVIDE AND CONFUSE THE FREE WORLD

This section seeks to assess the Soviet threat to the non-Communist world by methods short of Soviet military aggression. This section seeks also to set forth the panorama of Soviet attempts to convince the free world that the USSR seeks peace and that the US in particular is keeping the world unsettled and in danger of war. Included in this section would be every aspect of psychological warfare against the US and for the West (peace appeals, suggestions of 5-power conferences, etc.), attempts to undermine US leadership, and invitations to secure economic stability thru unrestricted East-West trade. (The impact of the Soviet program, as well as free world vulnerabilities which could aid it, is examined under Section II.)

- A. Stalinist strategy and tactics: Marxism, Leninism, ebb and flow, consolidation of strength, importance of economics, etc.
- B. Early postwar accretion of Soviet power.
- C. Soviet cold war tactics.
- D. The turning point in Western rearmament: Korea.
- E. Narrowing of areas in which external Communist aggression possible without grave risk of war.

F. Principal immediate Soviet objectives:

1. To break up unity of the West
2. To undermine US leadership of Western bloc
3. To prevent rearmament of Germany and Japan within defense system of free world
4. To exploit nationalism and general instability in North Africa and the Middle East
5. To break down East-West trade barriers to obtain strategic materials for Soviet programs
6. To consolidate and expand its influence in Asia

G. Recent and current Soviet maneuvers to affect world opinion.

II. FREE WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET THREAT

This section seeks to estimate the various Soviet approaches to and pressures on free world nations or areas to implement the Soviet objectives set forth under I.F. It also seeks to assess attitudes of free world nations to the Soviet threat, e.g. full recognition of threat but desire to appease, recognition of threat as latent, recognition of threat but overriding desire to trade with Soviet bloc, minimizing of threat because of preoccupation with other concerns (trade, nationalism, etc.) Where applicable, the overall position and outlook of each country in the East-West struggle is assessed. Distinctions should be drawn between official government attitudes, attitudes of important political opposition, attitudes of special groups (e.g. business), and attitudes of the population in general.

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The detailed questions which follow should be applied, where appropriate, to each country. They are submitted as a general guide rather than a rigid format. Although the final order of treatment by country or area will probably be determined by the results of research on the problem, it might be practical to commence by either a country or area breakdown as follows:

Scandinavia (including Finland)

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Non-Communist Europe

Balkans

Middle East and North Africa

South Asia

Southeast Asia

Far East

Latin America

A. What is the Soviet approach to the Government?

1. Has there been any shift in Soviet attitude, tactics, etc.?
2. Are there contradictions in the Soviet tactics? (e.g. simultaneously, hostility in propaganda, amiability in personal diplomatic relations, pressure for unrestricted trade)
3. Does the USSR attempt to speak or appeal directly to the population without regard to the government?
4. What are the immediate Soviet diplomatic goals in respect to the country?

5. To what extent is the Soviet Union pursuing its goals from point of view of urgency?
- B. What is the government's attitude toward the Soviet Union?
1. How does it assess the Soviet threat (from point of view of time, nature, and ability to combat, thwart or avoid)?
 2. Does government fear provoking the Soviet Union?
 3. Is government attitude toward Soviet threat uniformly shared in country?
 - a. Do businessmen, large segments of population think same?
 - b. Does political opposition affect government's attitude toward Soviet threat?
 - c. Is government policy likely to change radically if new government comes to power?
 4. Has there been any abrupt or gradual change in attitude in postwar period?
- C. What is government's attitude toward strong military forces or rearmament against Soviet threat?
1. Is government willing to face problem realistically?
 2. Is government hampered by economic pressures, internal pressures, fear of provoking Soviet Union?
 - a. Attitude of businessmen?
 - b. Attitude of public?
 - c. Attitude of political opposition?

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3. What is government's attitude toward military alliances?
 4. Is government's attitude colored by its fear of threat from source other than USSR?
- D. What is government's attitude toward the West?
1. Is this attitude colored by past or present experience with one or more Western powers?
 2. Is government's attitude toward US leadership colored by such experience?
 3. Does government's attitude contribute toward unrealistic estimate of Soviet threat?
 4. Does government's attitude prevent West from securing strategic areas?
 5. What attitudes are there in the country?
 - a. Among population
 - b. Businessmen, etc.
 - c. Political opposition
 - d. Other
- E. What is government's attitude toward trade with the Soviet bloc?
1. What pressures are placed on government to trade with Soviet bloc?
 - a. By public
 - b. By business interests
 - c. Other

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2. Is government trading with Soviet bloc now? To what degree?
 3. Is government embargoing trade (in whole or in part) with Soviet bloc?
 - a. How firm is government's intent?
 4. Does government consider trade with Soviet bloc necessary?
 5. What was government's attitude on the World Economic Conference in Moscow?
 - a. Public reaction
 - b. Business reaction
 - c. Any trend seen in initial reaction?
 6. Would government be able to resist mounting pressure to trade unrestrictedly with Soviet bloc?
- F. What is the history of the government's attitude toward the Korean war?
1. The extent of participation, if any.
 2. The attitude of the population?
 3. Attitude as expressed in UN or otherwise.
 4. Would it be likely to participate in repelling another aggression such as that in Korea? Would geographical location of aggression determine this attitude?
 5. Would government favor indiscriminate concessions to Communists to close out Korean war?

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- G. What is government's attitude toward foreign aid?
1. What controls does it accept?
 2. Is aid efficiently used to counter Soviet threat?
 3. What is public attitude?
 4. What is business attitude?
- H. Attitude of government toward US or other bases or troops on its territory?
1. Attitude of population.
 2. Attitude of political opposition.
 3. Would worsening of relationship between US and USSR affect this attitude?
 4. Would attitude be affected by indefinite period of lack of aggressive military moves by Soviet bloc?
- I. What has been government's attitude on East-West issues in UN?
1. Has government voted with the USSR on any important issue?
 2. Has government abstained on any important issue involving US vs. USSR interests?
 3. Has government undergone any change in cooperation with US or the West on important issues?

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III. (Probable conclusions or summary in finished estimate)

This section seeks to extract from Section I and II the patterns of attitudes of the free world in the East-West struggle. Where indicated by I and II it assesses relaxation of tensions vis-a-vis the Soviet threat, continuing apathy or firmness, or emerging firmness. This section seeks, in short, to summarize the origin and development of current free world attitudes toward the USSR, strengths and vulnerabilities of the free world in respect to such attitudes, and any continuing or emerging trends.